User talk:Morinao

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Honorary promotions and medals

Can't figure out where to put this anymore, but the Air & Space Forces Magazine version came out: https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/honorary-promotions/

Still working on the astronaut material, but got sidetracked because the American Indian Law Review accepted an article I submitted last year on the Wounded Knee Massacre, and a producer also contacted me on the same subject (he wants to film a documentary). The article was a Covid project that grew out of Senator Warren's staff citing me in their press releases (evidently I'm the only person to publish about the legal merits of revoking medals, or the history of actually revoking them in 1917). So I x-rayed Warren's bill, which was a total mess, and gave them and SASC/HASC some critical feedback, which resulted in them dropping it entirely. They were assuming that the modern criteria for the medal applied in 1890, thought that the MoH Roll was the list of all MoH recipients (it's a pension roll that probably had only a few of the Wounded Knee recipients on it), and presumed that impropriety tainted all of the medals (even one awarded to a soldier who didn't earn the medal there). Am very frustrated with the outcome of all this, because I actually support revoking some of the medals so long as they do it with statutory authority and have a process in place to properly screen the recipients for revocation, and then finally to give DoD a chance to weigh-in on it and decide for themselves. My idea is to use a scholarly review board to advise DoD, which is something that's been done several times for upgrades of medal packages tainted by structural discrimination. It would've worked, I think, but nobody is willing to compromise! Foxtrot5151 (talk) 00:53, 19 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Congratulations on the two articles! I can see how you might be disappointed at not achieving the optimal resolution for the Wounded Knee medals, which is to correct the historical record, but at least you prevented the status quo from getting worse.

Love the photo of Mitchell crouched under the wing of the airplane. Is that a swagger stick in his hand, or just a rod leaning against the wheel? Can't quite tell from the angle.

- Morinao (talk) 02:58, 26 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks. Not sure what that is in the photo, doesn't seem like there would be a need for support next to the wheel chock, so maybe it was a stick? They didn't ask me on the photos--that's entirely on their media editors. I did get a chance to review it prior to publication, but it wasn't anything like a journal or academic press. I was actually hoping they would link to some of the false claims, but alas, they didn't.

I've been sending links to various USAF offices trying to get claims corrected. I got a major command to agree to fix an error about Mitchell in an article, already had the command historian at USAFA agree to fix the plaque on the Mitchell statue, and got the policy proponent to agree to fix an error on Mitchell's rank in USAF Handbook 1 (which claimed he'd been posthumously promoted by FDR). AFPC's decorations branch wrote me saying they don't control the USAF website on the MoH, and don't know who does! So they're escalating to see if they can figure it out, but that's pretty odd.

Working on a documentary on the Wounded Knee business, which may give it some new life. Not sure when that will be out, but presumably a year or so. Will be collaborating with several scholars of Native American history to produce a series of recommendations on what medals to revoke, and why. I imagine we'll publish something else afterward, probably an edited volume. 131.252.240.190 (talk) 22:57, 27 February 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Got a phone call this week from GEN Steve Lorenz, formerly AETC commander at Randolph AFB, and deputy chief of the Senate liaison office at the time of the Eaker & Doolittle recognition. He recalled it and said he thought everything I covered was accurate. He said Goldwater was a really nice guy, and would go out of his way to get gifts for the staffers like him. Foxtrot5151 (talk) 21:08, 8 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Comment: FAA administrator

@Morinao and Foxtrot5151: Interesting developments in relation to congressional waivers for veteran nominees. Similar to the OLC and CRS rulings that MajGen Bolden didn't need a waiver to be NASA adminstrator, the FAA's general counsel has stated that Phil Washington, a retired Army CSM doesn't need a waiver to be FAA administrator. This was in response to criticism from Senator Ted Cruz, ranking member of the Senate Commerce Committee that is processing (and delaying) Washington's nomination. SuperWIKI (talk) 17:15, 23 March 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, what's the barrier again, is it statutory? Foxtrot5151 (talk) 21:09, 8 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

I believe it is statutory. The FAA administrator must be a civilian per 49 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2). That said, Washington's nomination has been withdrawn in the meantime. SuperWIKI (talk) 21:44, 8 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

Interesting, I just took a look. So being a retired member potentially runs afoul of that? Subsection d also has interesting language about the deputy administrator, and trying to prevent a conflict of interest if they are on active duty in the military. Foxtrot5151 (talk) 22:20, 8 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

On your question? I believe so. And I believe this was very much sacred territory for Generals Quesada (who resigned his commission) and McKee (who received a waiver) when they were nominated. SuperWIKI (talk) 23:44, 8 April 2023 (UTC)[reply]

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Disambiguation link notification for September 30

An automated process has detected that when you recently edited List of United States Navy four-star admirals, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Joseph Strauss.

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I have sent you a note about a page you started

Hi Morinao. Thank you for your work on Legislative history of United States four-star officers until 1865. Another editor, Hawkeye7, has reviewed it as part of new pages patrol and left the following comment:

If you can add a reference to the first paragraph of "History (colonial era)", the article grade will become B

To reply, leave a comment here and begin it with {{Re|Hawkeye7}}. (Message delivered via the Page Curation tool, on behalf of the reviewer.)

Hawkeye7 (discuss) 00:31, 3 October 2024 (UTC)[reply]

The implication of relieving multiple senior military leaders + DOPMA reform

@Neovu79, KingEdinburgh, EPMen, Morinao, and Foxtrot5151: Hello Morinao and others, wanted to know your thoughts on the feasibility of a significant clearing of senior military officers by the incoming administration, first discussed on KingEdinburgh's talk page. I am also requesting opinions on related scenarios and updates to the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980.

Overview

As members of the executive branch, senior military officers (thereafter referred to as officers) are nominated with Senate consent and removed at the pleasure of the president. "The pleasure" includes removal for lack of cooperation with the president. For uniformed personnel, civilian control of the military is especially important — civilian leadership listens to and respects the advice of officers, and in turn the officers are expected to obey legal orders, no matter what they are. However, this is the first time in recent history where an incoming administration views and bundles senior military leadership into a deep state that promotes opposition policies such as DEI (or "woke"). If this results in the unprecedented relief of multiple officers, it risks breaking the custom that the officers who serve across administrations should not be brought into partisan politics.

The crux of the justification for removal straddles the line between their duty as executive branch members — where they should work well with the CINC and be compliant (once ordered to legally), if not supportive of the CINC's directives — and as executors of their constitutional oath. Would General Nordhaus, the new chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB), be able to coordinate federalised Guardsmen to handle protestors under the Insurrection Act, legally but under circumstances which could be construed as political? "The line" between what is legal and what the military is typically expected to do will be tested like never before. The perception of personal as opposed to professional loyalty.

Officers in disagreement with the president-elect may opt to retire (newer ones likely stay until they reach time-in-grade retirement requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 636) or stick it out until being relieved for controversies relating to "the line". Officers have, in fairness, been relieved when disagreements with the administration end up too hot or in the media eye (Anderson [Cuba], Mattis [Syria]).

I listed my concerns on a Reddit post, but since I'm likely to get answers on the "dangers to democracy, etc, etc" without reference to the legislative or procedural details, I'm here to solicit opinions with regard to the appointments process.

Statistics and possible removals

Before I enter my initial opinions for discussion, here are some stats (accurate as of 9 November 2024). Of the four-star officers currently on active duty (44 in total):

9 are African American (including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs CQ Brown).
6 were initially promoted to four-star general or admiral during the first term of the incoming administration (one, GEN LaCamera, is retiring with a Senate-confirmed successor already in place).
3 are women, all initially appointed by the Biden administration, and as the first woman appointed to each of their roles, received a lot of publicity (ADMs Franchetti, Fagan, and Levine).
1 serves in a non-military political office that can hold the rank of admiral in the Public Health Service if desired (ADM Levine, the first openly transgender person to hold the rank of admiral).

Based on the above, the officers most likely to be reviewed are:

ADM Levine, who serves as Assistant Secretary for Health and holds military rank to outrank the surgeon general, VADM Murthy, is easily the first one out. As a political appointee who happens to hold military rank, she will be out when the current administration is.
Gen Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His highly-publicised response to the George Floyd killing for starters — it did not, however, cause his removal as AF chief of staff. His support for DEI initiatives raises some eyebrows, perhaps. Brown may be relieved halfway through his term, 1 October 2025, like how Gen Pace wasn't reappointed under the old rules.
ADM Franchetti, the first woman to be chief of naval operations (CNO). Her selection as CNO was highly publicized, following the 2021 promotions of GEN Richardson, Gen Van Ovost, and ADM Fagan (Richardson and Van Ovost have retired). The outgoing president made the call to choose Franchetti, overruling the DOD's pick (worth adding that she was the frontrunner among Navy Dept. insiders), thus giving the incoming administration a possible opening.

One of the responses on the earlier talk page indicated that officers of minority ethnicities may be targeted by the incoming DOD leadership, to make way for certain white males. There are more African American four-stars in the Armed Forces in history at the moment, including the first African American Marine Corps general, Gen Langley — who is very much of central casting adored by the president-elect.

Questions

What happens if the military has to comply with legal orders that, if followed, risk putting them in a blatantly political or immoral situation, or one that may be perceived as such? What is the fallout if this becomes more frequent and also threatens the by-no-means-compulsory custom that the military not be involved in partisan politics?
How is "deep-selecting" likely to figure into four-star and three-star officer selection in DOD next year? Secretary Rumsfeld was closely involved with selecting his top officers; the incoming DOD leadership may do so again to a far higher extent. During the incoming administration's first term, ADM Gilday was deep-selected as CNO after ADM Moran withdrew.
1. 10 U.S.C. § 601 states that officers above the O-6 grade are the most junior ones eligible for promotion to four-star. Is there any limitation, apart from Senate consent, that prevents the president from nominating a newly-minted one-star, or more plausibly, a two-star, for four-star grade?
2. Should the above be politically, if not legally, unacceptable under DOPMA procedures, could the Appointments Clause be used again to promote certain officers outside of this? I recall that only Senate consent limits the use of this provision, and a refresher could prove helpful.
Could a National Guardsman be appointed as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assuming Senate consent? If so, a current Adjutant General from a state deemed sound (same party alignment as the president-elect) and can work well with the CIC may be in the running. Without evidence, I opine (and hope to be corrected on this) that their willingness to obey legal orders may be of a different nature than full-time active duty officers.
Should incoming DOD political appointees (likely from the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness) issue guidelines for officer selection that imply partisan loyalty, or more likely emphasise compliance with legal orders regardless of the way the military is used as such, how would it be carried out? Could a special commission be created to vet officers on considerations that DOD civil servants, JCS J-1 (personnel), and service personnel directorates are not equipped to do?
Could the current officer selection provisions in Title 10, consisting of DOPMA with modifications from successive defense authorisation acts, be modified to buttress the considerations under question (2)(2)? DOPMA is now 40 years old after all.
Are there provisions outside Title 10 that allow for the recall of retired officers (current Title 10 provisions for recalls) to active duty, provided they are young enough to be recalled past the presidential deferment limit of 68? Secretary Rumsfeld recalled GEN Schoomaker to serve as Army chief of staff, and himself tried to raise the maximum age to 72.
This is unrelated to the overall topic, but is 10 U.S.C. § 527, which provides for the suspension of most officer grade limitations during a national emergency, still active? There's so many national emergencies happening now that I've lost track (the 9/11 national emergency proclamation remains in effect).

All of these concerns can be applied in some fashion to Title 14 and the Coast Guard; the PHS Commissioned Corps, and the NOAA Commissioned Corps (the NOAA may be targeted for elimination). Thank you and hope for responses, if not inconvenient, to this information and attached questions.

P.S. Foxtrot, I deeply apologise if I am disrupting you from your present work. Your insights on officer appointments, particularly on changes to the currently-modified DOPMA, are deeply appreciated. SuperWIKI (talk) 14:25, 10 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

May reply to some of this on KingEdinburgh's talk page to avoid splitting the discussion.

Senior military officials almost always choose to stick it out even when faced with a blatantly wrong or immoral policy, on the grounds that any publicity from a resignation will be quickly forgotten and insufficient to rescind the policy, which will have to be implemented anyway by a less principled or capable successor. So they might as well try to mitigate the bad effects for as long as they can until they are fired. This is why the JCS ultimately chose not to resign over McNamara's management of the Vietnam War, although they reportedly came very close, or Milley after that photo op. The closest recent examples that come to mind of general officers who retired early to protest a moral issue are Fogleman (Khobar Towers), Schloesser (Wanat), and perhaps Newbold and Batiste (Iraq).
I don't expect deep selection to play a major role until the new administration has time to develop a promotable cadre of trusted one- and two-stars, typically by hiring them as military aides. So probably not in the first year, except maybe to promote a couple of senior two-stars who were passed over by the previous administration, like Faller seemed to be until being rehired by his former CENTCOM boss Mattis, or Green after the Gallagher acquittal. Incidentally, deep selecting a one-star doesn't automatically confer the gravitas needed to be effective in a three- or four-star job -- look at J. J. Quinn's brief tenure as Rumsfeld's senior military assistant. (I have never thought the Gilday selection was particularly political, any more than the recent Miller or Conley selections.)
Without special legislation, a National Guardsman cannot be appointed CJCS because 10 USC 152(a) limits the position to officers from a regular component of the armed forces. 10 USC 152(b) further requires CJCS to have served as VCJCS, CSA, CNO, CSAF, CMC, CSO, or combatant commander, although the president can waive this restriction. The House version of the 2025 NDAA would add CNGB to that list of CJCS-qualifying positions, and also make CCG a full member of the JCS and eligible to be CJCS or VCJCS. If the CNGB provision passes, presumably there will be a conforming amendment to remove the regular component requirement. Otherwise it would be easier to appoint an overt loyalist as CJCS by recalling a retired regular G/FO like Flynn, Tata, or Bolduc. Regardless, I wouldn't expect a state TAG to be promoted directly to CJCS. It seems more likely that a TAG would first be appointed NORTHCOM commander to oversee domestic and border operations, and move up from there.
Three- and four-star officer selections are inherently political appointments, so the administration has a free hand to select from general and flag officers within the statutory age limits, subject to Senate confirmation, which is always the real gatekeeper. Below those ranks, it would be very difficult to select officers for promotion based on partisan loyalty because Title 10 strictly limits the information that can be considered by selection boards or Chapter 60 retention boards. That information is regulated by the secretary of defense, who in principle could add partisan affiliation or loyalty statements to each officer's personnel file. The boards would then have to be stacked with officers who are willing to torch the system and their own service reputations, since the services have spent two centuries trying to professionalize their officer corps by purging exactly this kind of partisan politics from their promotion system. All this would require time, effort, and a degree of bureaucratic and legislative acumen that seems unrealistic for any administration, let alone this one.
The real check on arbitrary officer appointments has always been the willingness of the Senate to confirm them, whatever the statutes might say, and particularly the Senate Armed Services Committee, whose senior Republican members (Wicker, Fischer) won't face another election until after Trump leaves office. Veterans like Cotton, Ernst, and Sullivan would also be inclined to slow-roll radical changes to personnel policy, and it only takes one senator to gum up the works, as we saw with Tuberville last year.
As far as I know, there are no provisions to recall a retired officer to active duty outside Title 10, Title 14 (USCG), Title 33 (which refers NOAA back to Title 10), or Title 42 (PHSCC).
The national emergencies exemption is still in statutory effect, but it always comes back to what the Senate is willing to confirm. At the end of the Iraq War in 2011, the Pentagon tried to preempt statutory postwar G/FO cuts by proactively eliminating some of the Iraq emergency positions, just like they tried to do after the Vietnam War by downgrading commands like USARPAC and USNAVEUR in the 1970s, but Congress wasn't buying and legislated the harsher G/FO reductions of 1977 and 2016. So I don't think this exemption is really active in practice anymore.

- Morinao (talk) 01:17, 17 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

My concerns were responded to in a way I would never have gotten elsewhere, thank you! Several things have changed since I initially asked this question: Army National Guard major and FOX News host Peter Hegseth has been tapped as SECDEF (whether he remains the presumptive nominee thru Jan. 20 is up in the air); and the aforementioned commission to clear senior officers may actually be a thing.

1) I assess that, with your answer, senior leadership turnover under the incoming administration will not lead to fundamental change. It could turn out to be a differently-flavoured version of the Rumsfeld era — SECDEF's personal involvement with personnel selection, and the removal of about 5–10 undesirables by the commission's study, sprinkled with a heavy dose of political rhetoric. That would be unprecedented but not catastrophic. The incoming administration doesn't have the time and patience to turn the officer corps into an ideological hotbed by stacking promotion boards and railroading DOPMA reform through the Senate. More politically malleable areas exist to spend time and political capital on, like the federal judiciary.

There is a caveat, however. According to a purported source from the transition team, veracity notwithstanding, everyone "elevated and appointed by Milley will be gone", once the commission publishes its findings. This "maximum" scenario, numbering at most around 100 officers, may punish an entire subset for the offences of one "unwanted" general. Moreover, since retirements are no longer confirmed by the Senate, this move could be undertaken administratively within DOD. The procedural lever the Senate can use to protest is symbolic, responding to retirement certifications under 10 U.S.C. § 1370, unless it reclaims its ability to confirm retirements, contravening the FY1996 NDAA.

What is your assessment here, based on both the accuracy and feasibility of both paragraphs?

2) As related in your military history articles, the elevation of "favourite" generals/admirals, retirement of "unwanted" generals/admirals is relatively common across administrations. This always comes with a new president (JFK — GEN Taylor, ADM Anderson; LBJ — GENs Wheeler, Gen Walt, LtGen V. Krulak), new SECDEF (Gates — Gen Moseley; Mattis: ADM Faller, LTG McMaster), or new service secretary (Lehman — ADM Rickover, VADM H. Mustin).

The incoming administration is concerned about officers who excessively focus on applying CRT/DEI in employing new personnel and educating existing personnel. As with the use of the military in mass deportations, the CRT/DEI policy position threatens the perception of the military's non-partisan stance, as viewed by hawks and social conservatives in Congress. In this climate, I judge that favoured generals and admirals are those who can be trusted to "look tough, fight tough, and promote tough" to allies and enemies alike. A modified methodology of the one used to select GEN Milley as CJCS.

What is your assessment of the "favourite generals/admirals" concept and it may manifest under the incoming administration? Specifically, could we see the return of rough-n-tough senior officers like Gen LeMay, as a standard among senior military?

3) I recently spruced up the Army four-star generals list in my spare time. Updated the history section by abridging your legislative four-star history articles, and updated the list with citations and positions leading the Army War College and congressionally-chartered organisations (American Legion, MCL, USO). Still waiting on USO to email me a list of their past CEOs (assuming they take me, a foreigner researching in a personal capacity, seriously) So far, the only applicable four-stars are GEN Tilelli and Gen Mundy (already in the USMC four-star list). I considered adding leadership of the main service professional associations (AUSA, USNI, AFA) but decided against it as their past leadership history is spotty, and they're non-profits anyway.

Do you have access to Heaton's Four Stars: The Super Stars of United States Military History? Book sites I've looked at limit shipping to the United States. Reason — I've tried to verify that General Robert J. Wood was indeed recalled as a general from 1968–69 to serve as Director, Overseas Base Requirements Study Group (and have altered the list to that effect) with exact dates in the footnote, but I don't trust it.

P.S. The subject on KingEdinburgh's talk page is on who exactly is to be replaced by the incoming administration. I will direct such queries to that page. SuperWIKI (talk) 17:44, 17 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]